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Abstract 
This article analyzes how and with what possible consequences REDD+ is framed in 
the national policy arena in Cameroon, Indonesia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Peru, 
Tanzania, and Vietnam. It analyzes the most prominent views and storylines around 
key REDD+ design features among policy actors and in policy documents. We focus 
on storylines related to four questions, namely: 1) What should REDD+ achieve: 
carbon or also non-carbon objectives? 2) Who should monitor REDD+ outcomes: 
only technical experts or also local communities? 3) At what level should REDD+ be 
governed: at national or sub-national level? and 4) How should REDD+ be financed: 
through market- or fund-based sources? The vast majority of policy actors and policy 
documents frame REDD+ as a mechanism that should also realize non-carbon 
benefits, yet non-carbon monitoring receives very little attention. In all but one 
country, policy documents contain plans to involve local communities in the design 
and/or execution of measuring, reporting and verifying REDD+ outcomes. With 
regard to the level at which REDD+ should be governed, while most policy 
documents contain elements of a nested approach to accounting, almost all countries 
envision a long-term transition to national accounting and benefit distribution. We 
found strikingly little discussion among policy actors and in policy documents of how 
to finance REDD+ and acquire results-based payments. In the conclusion we reflect 
on possible consequences of the prominence of REDD+ storylines in the seven 
countries, and argue that carbonization and centralization of forest governance are 
possible given the limited attention to non-carbon monitoring and the envisioned 
centralized approaches to REDD+. 
 
Key words: REDD+; Comparative discourse analysis; Co-benefits; Market-based 
approach; MRV; Centralization.  
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1. Introduction    
Though Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the role 
of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks (REDD+) is arguably one of the most advanced climate mitigation options, 
scholars and politicians are still debating and negotiating important aspects of its 
design, both within and outside the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). A variety of state and non-state actors are 
operationalizing REDD+ policies and practices at the global, national and project 
level based on a diversity of ideas of what constitutes REDD+. A large and growing 
body of literature aims to assess the progress in REDD+ policy development and 
implementation and the (possible) consequences (see e.g. Angelsen et al., 2009, 2012; 
Gupta et al., 2013; Levin et al., 2008). Much less literature analyzes the discourses of 
actors involved in REDD+, such as what REDD+ should achieve and how it should 
be operationalized. Discourse analyses are useful to describe or explain how certain 
ideas gain prominence over others and become institutionalized. They can provide 
important insight into the direction that a certain policy instrument such as REDD+ is 
likely to take, and what possible consequences this might have. Most of the existing 
REDD+ discourse analyses focus on the global REDD+ domain (Den Besten et al., 
2014; Hiraldo and Tanner, 2011). Only a few have investigated such discourses at the 
national level, and very few have done so comparatively (Pistorius et al., 2012; Di 
Gregorio et al., 2015; Van der Hoff et al., 2015).  
This article contributes to this small but growing body of literature by carrying 
out a cross-country comparative analysis of how REDD+ is framed among national 
policy actors and in national policy documents in Cameroon, Indonesia, Nepal, Papua 
New Guinea (PNG), Peru, Tanzania, and Vietnam. We focus on four key policy 
design features that have prominence in current scholarly and political debates and 
that determine the long-term effectiveness and equity of REDD+ (Vijge, 2015; Gupta 
et al., 2012; Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2012a, b; Angelsen et al., 2009, 2012). These 
can be expressed as four questions: 1) What should REDD+ achieve? 2) Who should 
monitor REDD+ outcomes? 3) At what level should REDD+ be governed? and 4) 
How should REDD+ be financed? Answers to these questions represent design 
options for REDD+ that are currently under consideration. Which options become 
prominent will affect what benefits REDD+ will generate and for whom, who has the 
power to monitor and govern REDD+, and who will bear the financial costs. Our aim 
is to analyze how debates around the four questions resonate in the national policy 
arenas of the seven countries, and draw implications for their national forest 
governance. We do so by assessing which views around these questions are prominent 
among national policy actors, and which storylines are reflected in the FRXQWULHV¶
Readiness Preparation Proposals (R-PPs), the REDD+ plans that are prepared as part 
of the World Bank¶V Forest Carbon Partnership Facility program.  
The next section presents the analytical framework related to the REDD+ 
storylines. Section 3 explains how discourse analysis is used to assess how policy 
actors and R-PPs frame REDD+. Section 4 presents our findings on policy actorV¶ 
views and policy document analysis related to the four questions illustrated above. 
Finally, the discussion and conclusion reflect on possible consequences of the 
prominence of storylines for national forest governance, drawing on our findings and 
existing literature.    
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2. Analytical framework and storylines around REDD+ 
This article uses a discursive approach to analyze the framing of REDD+. We draw 
RQ+DMHU¶VSGHILQLWLRQRIGLVFRXUVHDV³DQHQVHPEOHRILGHDVFRQFHSWV
and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set 
RISUDFWLFHVDQGWKURXJKZKLFKPHDQLQJLVJLYHQWRSK\VLFDODQGVRFLDOUHDOLWLHV´
REDD+ discourses matter because they shape policy debates around REDD+ design 
and justify specific policy design solutions (Den Besten et al., 2014; Hiraldo and 
Tanner, 2011). Discourse analysis of both spoken and written text²interviews and 
policy documents²can help to identify which understandings of REDD+ have gained 
prominence. In this article wHGUDZRQD³WKLQ´GLVFXUVLYHDSSURDFKE\FRQVLGHULQJ
discourses as one of the many important factors that can help identify institutional or 
political change (see Arts et al. 2010SIRUDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ³WKLFN´DQG
³WKLQ´GLVFXUVLYHDSSURDFKHV 
Discourse analysis is particularly useful in newly formed policy domains, such 
as REDD+, as policy actors are confronted with different views when deciding how to 
operationalize and implement REDD+. It also provides a window into the socio-
political implications of REDD+, since dominant and institutionalized discourses 
reveal who has decision-making authority over REDD+, what benefits REDD+ can 
generate, and for whom.  
 One way to operationalize discourses is through storylines. A storyline is a 
narrative that gives meaning to specific phenomena RU³WKURXJKZKLFKDFWRUVDUH
positioned, and through which specific ideas of µblame¶ and µresponsibility¶ and 
µurgency¶ and µresponsible behavior¶ DUHDWWULEXWHG´+DMHU, 1995, p. 64±65). By 
referring to a specific element of a storyline, policy actors can signal their position 
and evoke a storyline or discourse as a whole. We expect prominent storylines to be 
upheld by key policy actors, while official policy documents, such as R-PPs, can 
serve as an indication for the institutionalization of prominent storylines (Hajer, 1995; 
Sharp and Richardson, 2001; Rantala and Di Gregorio, 2014).  
In analyzing prominent storylines among policy actors and in the R-PPs of the 
seven countries, we draw on an expanded version of the analytical framework 
developed by Vijge (2015). We focus on four inter-related questions: 1) What should 
REDD+ achieve: carbon or also non-carbon objectives? 2) Who should monitor 
REDD+ outcomes: only technical experts or also local communities? 3) At what level 
should REDD+ be governed: at national or sub-national level? and 4) How should 
REDD+ should be financed: through market or fund-based sources? These four 
questions were identified through extensive literature reviews as some of the most 
important scholarly and political debates affecting REDD+ governance (Vijge, 2015; 
Gupta et al., 2012; Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2012a, b). We analyze four sets of 
storylines that constitute ranges of answers to the four questions. Table 1 presents 
specific indicators to assess the prominence of each of these storylines that are used in 
the rest of the article and are based on the core elements outlined below.  
In considering what REDD+ should achieve, we explore views about whether 
REDD+ is meant to generate carbon benefits alone, or should also generate other, so-
called non-carbon or co-benefits such as biodiversity conservation and poverty 
reduction. Some scholars suggest that REDD+ should primarily be a (cost-)effective 
climate mitigation option. Others focus on the importance to avoid negative impacts 
on²or safeguard²non-carbon benefits (see e.g. Arhin, 2014 for an overview). Yet 
others see great value in REDD+ as a mechanism to also promote the sustainable 
management of forests or sustainable development more broadly (Chhatre et al., 
2012; Levin et al., 2008; McDermott, 2014; Phelps et al., 2012; Nielsen, 2014). We 
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analyze three storylines, namely the carbon, safeguards and co-benefits storyline 
(Table 1). A number of scholars argue that a prime focus on carbon benefits may lead 
WRD³FDUERQL]DWLRQ´RIIRUHVWJRYHUQDQFHZKHUHHPLVVLRQUHGXFWLRQVEHFRPHWKHVROH
focus of forest management and governance at the expense of non-carbon benefits 
(Vijge and Gupta, 2014, p. 18; see also Vijge, 2015; Gupta et al., 2012, 2014; Mert, 
2009; Stephan, 2012). To assess the framing and planned operationalization of what 
REDD+ should achieve in the R-PPs, we study which carbon and/or non-carbon 
objectives will be monitored and how detailed the proposed measuring, reporting and 
verification (MRV) and/or safeguard information systems are. 
In considering who should monitor REDD+ outcomes, many scholarly and 
political debates focus on the role of technical and local knowledge and the level of 
participation of local communities in monitoring (see e.g. Vijge, 2015; Gupta et al., 
2012; Larrazbal et al., 2012; Danielsen et al., 2011; Nielsen, 2014; Angelsen et al., 
2009; Melo et al., 2014). Studies show that high-tech monitoring systems can present 
trade-offs with community-based monitoring approaches (Murdiyarso et al., 2012). 
The three storylines that we analyze are: the expert-based, expert-based devolution 
and the collaboration storyline (Table 1). Due to the centrality of monitoring systems 
in REDD+ debates, policies and practices, a focus on expert knowledge may 
empower scientific elites at the cost of those without scientific knowledge or 
expertise, such as local communities (Gupta et al., 2012, 2014; Den Besten et al., 
2014; Buizer et al., 2014; Gupta et al. 2012, 2014). This has also been referred to as a 
³WHFKQLFDOL]DWLRQ´trend (Gupta et al., 2014, p. 182). In considering how debates 
around this topic resonate in the national policy arena, we assess views among policy 
actors regarding the authority of scientific experts and the involvement of local 
communities. We assess evidence from R-PPs on who will be involved in designing 
and executing MRV systems and whose knowledge is considered important. In doing 
so, we also consider whether the proposed MRV methods allow for the participation 
of local communities.  
In analyzing at what level REDD+ should be governed, we explore views on 
the level at which carbon from REDD+ activities should be accounted for. Prominent 
debates relate to whether REDD+ should be accounted for at the national level to 
prevent leakage (i.e. displaced emissions) and enable linkages to existing forest 
policies and programs, or at the sub-national level to allow for context-specific 
measures (Van der Hoff et al., 2015; Bushley, 2014; Levin et al., 2008). The prime 
focus of REDD+ accounting activities, funding and REDD+ compensation at the 
national government level, as well as empirical evidence of REDD+ policy processes, 
has led a number of scholars to assert that REDD+ can OHDGWRD³FHQWUDOL]DWLRQ´RI
forest governance, and in some cases reverse the long-standing trend of 
decentralization of forest governance. This could disempower actors operating at the 
sub-national level, including local communities (Toni, 2011, p. 67; Phelps et al., 
2010; Sandbrook et al., 2010; Vijge and Gupta, 2014; Angelsen et al., 2009; Rantala 
and Di Gregorio, 2014; Buizer et al., 2014). We assess views among policy actors on 
whether REDD+ accounting and payments should go through the national 
government. We also assess whether the R-PPs propose a national, sub-national, or 
nested (i.e. a combination of national and sub-national) approach in establishing 
reference levels for monitoring forest carbon stock, and whether they envision 
handling and distributing REDD+ payments at the national, sub-national and/or 
project level (Table 1).   
Finally, in considering how REDD+ should be financed, we focus on whether 
REDD+ should be market- or fund-based. Some policy advisors and scholars have 
 5 
praised REDD+ for incentivizing a variety of actors to engage in forest conservation 
by enabling trade in forest carbon (see e.g. Eliasch, 2008; Stern, 2007). Others, 
however, criticize the neo-liberal logic of REDD+ and the ³PDUNHWL]DWLRQ´of forest 
carbon, highlighting the adverse equity and effectiveness implications of turning 
(certain aspects of) forests into commodities (Melo et al., 2014; Vijge, 2015; Stephan, 
2012; Corbera, 2012; Van der Hoff et al., 2015; Nielsen, 2014; Buizer et al., 2014; 
McAfee, 2012). In this article we analyze views among policy actors regarding the 
preferred funding mechanism for REDD+. We also analyze visions expressed in the 
R-PPs regarding what type of finances²market-based, fund-based, or a mix 
thereof²should be relied on in the long run, and what arrangements are made for the 
acquisition of such finances (Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
   
Table 1: Main storylines and indicators around the four questions (source: adapted 
from Vijge, 2015). 
What should REDD+ achieve? 
 Carbon storyline Safeguards storyline Co-benefits storyline 
What are the main 
objectives of 
REDD+? 
Carbon benefits  
 
Carbon benefits, but 
safeguarding non-
carbon values 
Carbon and non-
carbon benefits  
Which objectives 
will be monitored? 
MRV of carbon 
benefits 
MRV of carbon 
benefits and safeguard 
information / 
monitoring system 
 
MRV of carbon and 
non-carbon benefits 
Who should monitor REDD+ outcomes? 
 Expert-based 
storyline 
Expert-based 
devolution storyline 
Collaboration 
storyline 
Who develops MRV 
systems, drawing on 
whose knowledge? 
Technical experts, 
using scientific 
knowledge  
Technical experts, 
using scientific 
knowledge with 
involvement of local 
communities 
Both technical 
experts and local 
communities, using 
scientific and local 
knowledge  
Who executes MRV 
with which 
methods? 
Technical experts, 
using high-tech 
methods and on-
the-ground 
inventories 
Technical experts, 
with limited 
involvement of local 
communities, using 
high-tech methods and 
participatory on-the-
ground inventories 
Both technical 
experts and local 
communities, using 
(among others) 
participatory on-the-
ground inventories 
At what level should REDD+ be governed? 
 National 
storyline 
Nested storyline Sub-national 
storyline 
What is the proposed 
reference level? 
National level Both national and sub-
national / project level 
Sub-national and/or 
project level  
At what level are 
REDD+ payments 
handled and 
distributed? 
National level  Payments (eventually) 
received at national 
level, distributed and 
managed at sub-
national / project level  
Sub-national and/or 
project level 
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How should REDD+ be financed? 
 Market-based 
storyline 
Hybrid storyline Fund-based 
storyline 
What is the 
envisioned long-
term funding 
approach? 
Sale of carbon 
credits  
Sale of carbon credits 
and fund-based 
finances 
Fund-based finances 
What arrangements 
are made for the 
acquisition of 
funding? 
Stimulating 
carbon markets 
Stimulating both 
carbon markets and 
fund-raising  
Stimulating fund-
raising 
 
As argued above, an analysis of the prominence of particular storylines around 
REDD+ can help to assess and explain which design options become dominant and 
what possible consequences this may have for forest governance. Hence, our 
analytical framework allows us to draw conclusions on whether the above-described 
WUHQGVRI³FDUERQL]DWLRQ´³WHFKQLFDOL]DWLRQ´³FHQWUDOL]DWLRQ´DQG³PDUNHWL]DWLRQ´of 
forest governance are likely to occur in any of the seven countries (see section 5).  
 
3. Research methodology    
The analysis in this article draws on qualitative as well as quantitative research 
methods. Information about the views of policy actors was derived from national 
surveys carried out between 2010 and 2013 with representatives of organizations that 
were relevant for REDD+ decision-making at the national level, including 94 
government agencies, 133 non-governmental organizations, 51 businesses, 64 
international organizations, 37 research institutes and 9 others not included in the 
above categories. Each survey covered from 40 to more than 60 policy actors, 
depending on the size of the countr\¶s REDD+ policy domain. Respondents were 
asked to rate theLURUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VUDWKHUWKDQpersonal) level of (dis)agreement with 
35 specific position statements, or stances, on REDD+. A likert scale was used to rate 
their responses, ranging from 1²meaning strongly disagree²to 5²meaning strongly 
agree (for full information on the surveys, see Brockhaus et al., 2014). Responses to 
four stances were used WRDVVHVVPRUHJHQHUDOO\SROLF\DFWRUV¶positions related to 
the four identified questions (Table 2). Note that these are not a perfect reflection of 
the storylines presented in section 2, but relate to the same four questions discussed in 
that section. ,QFRQVLGHULQJDFWRUV¶SRVLWLRQV on these stances, wherever we refer to 
powerful actors in this article, we refer to actors that a large number of respondents 
FRQVLGHUHGDV³HVSHFLDOO\LQIOXHQWLDO´ in shaping national REDD+ policies. 
 
 
Table 2: 6WDQFHVXVHGWRLGHQWLI\SROLF\DFWRUV¶SRVLWLRQVrelated to the four questions. 
Four questions Related stances 
What should REDD+ 
achieve? 
³$OO5(''VFKHPHVaimed at reducing CO2 emissions 
should also require the realization of other key benefits like 
SRYHUW\UHGXFWLRQDQGELRGLYHUVLW\FRQVHUYDWLRQ´ 
Who should monitor REDD+ 
outcomes? 
³6FLHQWLILFH[SHUWVDUHWKHEHVWDQGILQDODXWKRULW\RQ
5(''´ 
At what level should REDD+ 
be governed? 
³$OO5(''DFFRXQWLQJDQGSD\PHQWVVKRXOGJRWKURXJKWKH
QDWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWV´ 
How should REDD+ be 
financed? 
³5(''VFKHPHVVKRXOGRQO\EHILQDQFHGWKURXJKIXQGV´ 
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We complemented our analysis of the surveys with qualitative observations 
from semi-structured interviews, which were carried out as a follow-up to the surveys 
at the same time and with the same policy actors. The surveys and interviews were 
conducted face-to-face by individual country teams DVSDUWRI&,)25¶V*OREDl 
Comparative Study on REDD+ (see www.cifor.org/gcs). Relevant organizations were 
selected on the basis of earlier studies and experience from researchers involved in the 
Global Comparative Study. Interviews were carried out using a guide with open-
ended questions, and were recorded and transcribed in their entirety (see Brockhaus et 
al., 2014). 
In analyzing the framings of REDD+ in each of the countries, we focus on the 
Readiness Preparation Proposals (R-PPs) that are developed as part of the World 
%DQN¶V)RUHVW&DUERQ3DUWQHUVKLS)DFLOLW\ (FCPF). The FCPF is one of the largest 
REDD+ readiness programs. It provides technical and financial support to help 
countries build their capacity to participate in REDD+ programs and activities. The 
reason for choosing to analyze R-PPs is that these provide important insights into the 
direction of national REDD+ strategies and program activities (Angelsen et al., 2009). 
Moreover, the R-PPs follow a unique format, allowing for systematic comparisons 
across countries. The seven countries were selected from three continents²Africa, 
Asia and Latin America²based on their relevance for and early engagement in 
REDD+. Currently, all seven countries are in the readiness or implementation phase 
of REDD+ and have finalized their R-PPs (Brockhaus et al., 2014). We draw on 
additional observations from Emission Reduction Program Idea Notes (ER-PINs)²
which follow the R-PPs²for the countries within our selection that have developed 
these: Indonesia, Nepal, Peru and Vietnam. In order to systematically analyze the R-
PPs, ER-PINs, as well as the semi-structured interviews, the documents and 
transcripts were coded with the software program NVivo, using the indicators 
presented in section 2.  
Though the R-PPs have been developed in different years (ranging from 2009 
to 2013), we did not find evidence that more recent R-PPs were more advanced or 
reflected later progress in REDD+ negotiations. Since the surveys were not carried 
out in the same years as the R-PPs were developed, we do not draw causal links 
between the views of policy actors and the reflection of storylines in the R-PPs. We 
recognize that the prominence of views expressed by policy actors does not alone 
provide an indication of the dominance of issues in national policy dialogues among 
these actors. Similarly, storylines expressed in the R-PPs may differ from storylines 
expressed in other REDD+ policy documents, such as national REDD+ strategies. 
Through reliance on both qualitative and quantitative data from interviews, surveys, 
policy documents, as well as relevant recent literature, triangulation of data ensured 
the validity of our research findings (Creswell, 2014). Because of the large diversity 
among countries in terms of their institutional frameworks as well as the 
constellations of REDD+ actors, the discussion of this article contains a reflection of 
the possible consequences of the prominence of storylines, rather than possible 
explanations of their prominence.  
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4. Results 
This section presents the results of our analysis, structured around our four questions, 
drawing on national surveys, semi-structured interviews, and the analysis of R-PPs 
and ER-PINs.  
 
4.1. What should REDD+ achieve? 
The vast majority of policy actors in the seven countries agreed that REDD+ should 
also deliver non-carbon benefits such as poverty reduction and biodiversity 
conservation, while none of the actors strongly disagreed with this (Figure 1). 
Compared to the other issues we analyzed, co-benefits were most frequently 
discussed by policy actors in the semi-structured interviews, though the question of 
how to operationalize these received much less attention and was often left 
unanswered. In line with this, most R-PPs under study reflect the co-benefits 
storyline, though there are significant differences in how much importance R-PPs 
attach to non-carbon benefits (Table 3; Figure 5).  
Of the five R-PPs that reflect the co-benefits storyline, &DPHURRQ¶V5-PP most 
strongly emphasizes the non-carbon benefits of REDD+. Cameroon¶V5-PP frames 
5(''DVD³GHYHORSPHQWWRROthat must help the country achieve [its] sustainable 
GHYHORSPHQWREMHFWLYH´ (R-PP Cameroon, 2013, p. 1). To realize this vision, a special 
XQLWIRU³6WUDWHJLF(QYLURQPHQWDODQG6RFLDO(valuation´ should evaluate and monitor 
the realization of both carbon and non-carbon benefits. REDD+ pilot projects in 
Cameroon are required to contribute to rather than only safeguard environmental, 
social and governance co-benefits (see also Dkamela, 2011).  
Also the R-PPs of Indonesia, Nepal, Tanzania and Vietnam reflect the co-
benefits storyline in their framing of REDD+, though less strongly than Cameroon. 
These countries frame carbon and non-carbon benefits as equally important (see also 
Pham et al., 2012). Their R-PPs envision a cross-sectoral approach to integrate their 
REDD+ strategies with other policies, most notably development and poverty 
reduction strategies. In terms of their plans to monitor carbon and non-carbon 
benefits, however, there are significant differences between the four countries.  
1HSDO¶V5-PP contains detailed plans to operationalize the unanimous view 
among Nepalese policy actors that REDD+ should also generate non-carbon benefits 
(Figure 1). 1HSDO¶V5-PP is one of the few which outlines comprehensive baseline 
studies for non-carbon values and detailed strategies to develop MRV systems both 
for safeguarding and enhancing non-carbon benefits. 1HSDO¶V5-PP frames the World 
%DQN¶Vmandatory Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment (SESA) 
framework as a tool WRDFKLHYH1HSDO¶VSRYHUW\UHGXFWLRQ strategy. In contrast, 
9LHWQDP¶V5-PP largely frames SESA as a framework that enables necessary 
compliance with World Bank policies to safeguard²rather than also contribute to²
non-carbon benefits.  
Tanzania¶V and Indonesia¶V R-PPs contain the least detailed strategies for 
measuring, reporting and verifying non-carbon benefits (see also Indrarto et al., 2012; 
Jagger et al., 2014). Though Tanzania has served as pilot for REDD+ social and 
environmental standards, neither its R-PP, nor its national REDD+ strategy outline 
detailed plans to develop safeguards or operationalize non-carbon benefits for 
REDD+ (Jagger et al., 2014).  
The ER-PINs of both Vietnam and Indonesia provide more detailed plans on 
how to measure non-carbon benefits, listing specific indicators in the mandatory 
section on social and environmental benefits. Hence, with the development of their 
ER-PINs, the differences between ERWKFRXQWULHV¶ proposed non-carbon MRV systems 
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have decreased compared to, for instance, Nepal (see also Astuti and McGregor, 
2015).  
The safeguards storyline is reflected in the R-PPs of Papua New Guinea and 
Peru. Though Papua New Guinea was the country with the second highest percentage 
(96%) of policy actors agreeing that REDD+ should also generate non-carbon 
benefits, PNG¶V5-PP places least emphasis on non-FDUERQEHQHILWV31*¶V5-PP 
frames REDD+ DVDQLPSRUWDQWFRQWULEXWLRQWR³31*¶VORQJVWDQGLQJFRPPLWPHQWLQ
addressing global climatHFKDQJH´5-PP PNG, 2013, p. 7). Safeguards are deemed 
QHFHVVDU\WRDYRLG³HQGDQJHU>LQJ@WKHREMHFWLYHVRI5(''DFWLYLWLHV´S3ODQV
to develop safeguard policies and a safeguard information system are relatively 
GHWDLOHG31*¶V5-PP does not, however, contain a detailed strategy to measure, 
report and verify non-carbon benefits.  
Also Peru¶V5-PP frames REDD+ primarily as a climate change mitigation 
option (see also Piu and Menton, 2014; White, 2014). SESA is framed as a means to 
HQVXUHWKDW³R-PP components have the least possible impact in social and 
HQYLURQPHQWDOWHUPV´ (p. 102). 6LPLODUO\WR31*¶V5-PP, while safeguard indicators 
are identified, an MRV system for non-FDUERQEHQHILWVLVQRWRXWOLQHGLQ3HUX¶V5-PP. 
Despite this, Peru is one of the few countries that mention ideas to promote rather 
than only monitor and safeguard non-carbon benefits. Hence, while in the framing of 
objectives 3HUX¶V5-PP reflects the safeguards storyline, the planned 
operationalization of these objectives sits closer to the co-benefits storyline (Figure 
5).  
 
 
Figure 1: 3HUFHQWDJHVRISROLF\DFWRUVGLVDJUHHLQJZLWKWKHVWDQFH³$OO5(''
schemes aimed at reducing CO2 emissions should also require the realization of 
other key benefits like poverty reduction and ELRGLYHUVLW\FRQVHUYDWLRQ´.  
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Table 3: Framing of what REDD+ should achieve in the R-PPs (and ER-PINs). 
What should REDD+ achieve? 
 What are the main objectives of 
REDD+? 
Which objectives will be monitored? 
Cameroon Sustainable development ĺ 
(Strong) co-benefits storyline 
Carbon and non-carbon benefits ĺ Co-
benefits storyline 
Indonesia Multiple carbon and non-carbon 
benefits ĺ Co-benefits storyline 
Not much detail on safeguards or non-
carbon MRV 
Nepal Multiple carbon and non-carbon 
benefits ĺ Co-benefits storyline 
Carbon and non-carbon benefits and 
safeguards ĺ Co-benefits storyline 
PNG Climate change mitigation ĺ 
Safeguards storyline 
Carbon benefits and safeguards ĺ 
Safeguards storyline 
Peru Climate change mitigation ĺ 
Safeguards storyline 
Carbon benefits and safeguards, ideas to 
enhance non-carbon benefits ĺ 
Safeguards / co-benefits storyline 
Tanzania Multiple carbon and non-carbon 
benefits ĺ Co-benefits storyline 
Not much detail on safeguards or non-
carbon MRV  
Vietnam Multiple carbon and non-carbon 
benefits ĺ Co-benefits storyline 
Carbon benefits and safeguards, non-
carbon policies mentioned ĺ 
Safeguards / co-benefits storyline 
 
4.2. Who should monitor REDD+ outcomes?  
Regarding the question who should monitor REDD+ outcomes (only technical experts 
or also local communities), around half of the policy actors across all countries 
disagreed with the stance that scientific experts are the best and final authority on 
REDD+, while around 20% agreed. Policy actors in Nepal and Tanzania were most 
strongly united in disagreement that experts are the best and final authority; more than 
70% disagreed in each of these countries (Figure 2). In most countries, the majority of 
the actors disagreed with the stance, while government agencies²including the most 
powerful ones²were strongly divided in their views on this.  
The collaboration storyline is prominent in most of the countries we analyzed; 
six of the seven R-PPs outline strategies to involve not only technical experts but also 
local communities in the execution as well as in the design of REDD+ MRV systems 
(Figure 5; see also Angelsen et al., 2012). There are, however, significant differences 
in how far-reaching R-PPs are with regard to involving local communities in 
proposed MRV systems (Table 4).  
Cameroon, Nepal, Peru, Vietnam and, albeit with less detail, Tanzania, all 
outline plans to establish stakeholder committees to involve non-governmental 
organizations, community-based organizations, and/or local or indigenous 
communities in the development of their MRV systems. Peru, Cameroon and Nepal 
also plan to involve these committees in the development of reference scenarios and 
non-carbon MRV systems, and intend to draw on local knowledge in developing their 
REDD+ strategy. In addition, Cameroon, Nepal, Vietnam and, again to a lesser 
extent, Tanzania, outline plans to develop methods, protocols and/or principles for 
stakeholder participation in the monitoring of REDD+ outcomes.  
Despite the fact that relatively more policy actors in Vietnam agreed with the 
stance that scientific experts are the best and final authority on REDD+ (Figure 2), 
Vietnam¶V5-PP contains the most detailed plans for participatory monitoring. The 
country plans to develop protocols to allow forest owners to submit data to its 
national MRV system (see also Pham et al., 2012). Also Nepal seeks to develop a 
uniform approach to participatory monitoring for REDD+. 1HSDO¶V R-PP intends to 
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draw on experiences with participatory forest monitoring in existing community-
based forest management systems. Both Nepal and Tanzania have undertaken pilot 
activities to develop participatory REDD+ MRV methods (see also Pratihast et al., 
2013). Cameroon has no such experience (Dkamela, 2011; Pratihast et al., 2013), but 
envisions a ³SULPDU\UROH´IRUORFDODQGLQGLJHQRXVFRPPXQLWLHVLQWKHYDOLGDWLRQDQG
monitoring of its REDD+ MRV system as well as in the collection of data that will 
feed into this system (R-PP Cameroon, 2013, p. 97).  
Though 3HUX¶V5-PP strongly emphasizes community involvement and the use 
of local knowledge in the design of 3HUX¶Vnational REDD+ MRV system, no plans 
are outlined for participatory monitoring, not even in WKHFRXQWU\¶VER-PIN (see also 
White, 2014). The monitoring of non-FDUERQEHQHILWVLVVDLGWREH³DWHFKQLFDOWDVN
WKDWZLOOEHFDUULHGRXWE\LQVWLWXWLRQVVSHFLDOL]LQJLQWKLVVXEMHFW´(R-PP Peru, 2011, 
p. 130). HenceZKLOH3HUX¶V5-PP reflects the collaboration storyline in the design of 
its MRV system, it is the only R-PP we analyzed that reflects the expert-based 
devolution storyline in the planned execution of this system. 
,QGRQHVLD¶V5-PP only weakly reflects the collaboration storyline. It states that 
ORFDODQGLQGLJHQRXVFRPPXQLWLHVZLOOSOD\DQ³HQRUPRXVO\LPSRUWDQWUROH´LQWKH
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI5(''XVLQJWUDGLWLRQDONQRZOHGJHDVWKH³EDVLV´IRUWKH
development of its REDD+ strategy (R-PP Indonesia, 2009, p. 26). However, neither 
,QGRQHVLD¶V5-PP nor its ER-PIN contain any details on how to involve local 
communities in MRV design or execution.  
The expert-based storyline is reflected only in the R-PP of Papua New Guinea. 
The country allocates the largest part of its REDD+ funding to the development of an 
MRV system that is compliant with the good practice guidelines of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which will be checked by 
internal and external (UNFCCC) experts. 31*¶V5-PP does not mention the 
involvement of local communities in the development of this system. It seeks to 
³DGGUHVVWKHVDIHJXDUGVRQWKHIXOODQGHIIHFWLYHSDUWLFLSDWLRQRI«LQGLJHQRXV
SHRSOHVDQGORFDOFRPPXQLWLHV´PHUHO\WKURXJh an open access web-portal (R-PP 
PNG, 2013, p. 100).  
 
 
Figure 2: Percentages of national policy actors (dis)agreeing with the stance 
³6FLHQWLILFH[SHUWVDUHWKHEHVWDQGILQDODXWKRULW\RQ5(''´.  
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Table 4: Framing of who should monitor REDD+ in the R-PPs (and ER-PINs). 
Who should monitor REDD+ outcomes? 
 Who develops MRV systems, 
drawing on whose knowledge? 
Who executes MRV with which 
methods? 
Cameroon Stakeholder committees to develop 
(carbon and non-carbon) MRV, also 
drawing on local knowledge ĺ 
Collaboration storyline 
Local communities may supplement 
data for national carbon accounting 
system ĺ Collaboration storyline 
Indonesia No details on proposed stakeholder 
participation for MRV development 
ĺ (Weak) collaboration storyline 
Participatory MRV to be encouraged, 
but no details ĺ (Weak) 
collaboration storyline 
Nepal Stakeholder committees to develop 
(carbon and non-carbon) MRV, also 
drawing on local knowledge ĺ 
Collaboration storyline 
Uniform approach for participatory 
monitoring, drawing on experience 
with participatory methods ĺ 
Collaboration storyline 
PNG Experts, drawing on IPCC 
guidelines. No mention of 
community involvement ĺ Expert-
based storyline 
Experts, drawing on IPCC 
guidelines. No strategy to involve 
local communities ĺ Expert-based 
storyline 
Peru Stakeholder committees to develop 
(carbon and non-carbon) MRV, also 
drawing on local knowledge ĺ 
Collaboration storyline 
No details on participatory 
monitoring ĺ Expert-based 
devolution storyline 
Tanzania Technical support group to develop 
MRV includes community-based 
organizations ĺ (Weak) 
collaboration storyline 
No details on participatory 
monitoring, yet pilot activities 
undertaken ĺ (Weak) collaboration 
storyline 
Vietnam Stakeholder committees to develop 
MRV ĺ Collaboration storyline 
Detailed strategy to develop 
protocols for forest owners to submit 
data to national MRV system ĺ 
Collaboration storyline 
 
4.3. At what level should REDD+ be governed?  
Views regarding the level at which REDD+ should be governed (national or sub-
national) were the most divergent compared to the other stances, both within and 
across countries (Figure 3). Also government agencies within countries were strongly 
divided on this issue. Though many R-PPs fail to outline full-fledged plans for 
REDD+ accounting and payment distribution (see also Angelsen et al., 2012), all 
countries make at least some reference to sub-national accounting. Almost all R-PPs 
exemplify elements of the nested storyline in their proposed reference levels. 
However, most countries advocating a nested approach envision a long-term 
transition to national accounting and assume that REDD+ payments will be handled at 
and distributed through the national level (Table 5; see also Pham et al., 2013).  
The national storyline is particularly prominent in Cameroon, Indonesia, PNG 
and Tanzania in their plans to handle and distribute REDD+ payments (Figure 5). 
This is salient given that more policy actors in these countries disagreed than agreed 
with the stance that REDD+ accounting and payments should go through the national 
JRYHUQPHQW)LJXUH&DPHURRQ¶V5-33VWDWHVWKDW³WKH6WDWHZLOOSOD\DQHVVHQWLDO
role in the management of carbon credits DWWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHO´R-PP Cameroon, 
2013, p. 74), but does not provide much detail on this issue (see also Pham et al., 
2013)$OVR,QGRQHVLD¶V5-PP (albeit with few details) and ER-PIN envision a 
QDWLRQDOUHJLVWU\DQGSD\PHQWGLVWULEXWLRQPHFKDQLVP$FFRUGLQJWR31*¶V5-PP, a 
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national board of directors will provide guidelines and goals for benefit distribution 
and allocate funds to sub-national entities. In Tanzania, the most powerful 
government actors were in favor of a national system for REDD+ accounting (see also 
Rantala and Di Gregorio, 2014). In line with this, Tanzania (again without much 
detail) plans to develop a national REDD+ trust fund with possibility for direct 
payments to individuals (see also Angelsen et al., 2012; Pham et al., 2013).  
A combination of the national and nested storyline is reflected in the R-PPs of 
Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Tanzania in their proposed reference levels (Figure 
5). Though plans for building national reference levels are outlined, none of these 
countries provides details on how to develop the envisioned sub-national reference 
levels. Both 31*¶VDQG7DQ]DQLD¶VR-PPs mention national and sub-national 
reference levels, but no details are provided on how sub-national reference levels may 
feed into the proposed national carbon accounting systems. Indonesia aims to be an 
example country for the nested approach, yet its R-PP only mentions the development 
of a national carbon accounting system with sub-QDWLRQDOUHIHUHQFHOHYHOV³ZKHUHYHU
QHHGHG´5-PP Indonesia, 2009, p. 36).  
The nested storyline is reflected in the R-PPs of Nepal, Peru and Vietnam in 
their plans to develop reference levels as well as²in the case of Peru and Vietnam²
in their plans to handle and distribute REDD+ payments1HSDO¶V5-PP plans to 
develop a monitoring and reporting system to integrate national, regional, district and 
PDQDJHPHQWXQLWOHYHOVDQGWKHFRXQWU\¶V(5-PIN outlines several sub-national 
reference levels. $FFRUGLQJWR1HSDO¶V5-PP and ER-PIN, the most appropriate level 
for payment distribution is yet to be determined (see also Pham et al., 2013). 
9LHWQDP¶V5-PP and ER-PIN plan to develop sub-national reference levels based on 
eco-regions, yet aim to eventually transition to a national accounting system. Vietnam 
also plans (albeit without much detail) a distribution mechanism whereby the national 
government will receive and distribute REDD+ payments to provincial and later also 
WRGLVWULFWIXQGVZKLFKLQWXUQZLOO³UHFHLYHPDQDJHDQGPDNHXVH´RIWKHVH
payments (ER-PIN Vietnam, 2014, p. 33; see also Pham et al., 2013). 
The nested storyline is most strongly reflected in 3HUX¶V5-PP, which even 
contains elements of the sub-national storyline. This is salient given that some of the 
most powerful actors in Peru agreed that REDD+ payments should go through the 
national government3HUXFDOOVLWVHOID³SLRQHHULQSURSRVLQJDQHVWHGDSSURDFK´ (R-
PP Peru, 2011, p. 84)3HUX¶VQDWLRQDOUHIHUHQFHVFHQDULRZLOOEHGHYHORSHG in line 
with its decentralization process, through aggregation of regional reference scenarios. 
These will be built in collaboration with regional REDD+ roundtables, taking account 
RI³WKHXQLTXHEDFNJURXQGDQGIHDWXUHVRIHDFKUHJLRQ´ (p. 109). Though REDD+ 
reporting in Peru will be done nationally, separate accounting of emission reductions 
should be possible at all levels. 3HUX¶V5-PP even states that ³the future international 
rules of the REDD+ mechanism should permit the accounting of sub-national 
emissions and not make access to international incentives by sub-national initiatives 
GHSHQGHQWRQUHGXFWLRQVRIQDWLRQDOHPLVVLRQV´ (R-PP Peru, 2011, p. 99). 3HUX¶V(5-
PIN, however, states that in the long run, benefits will be channeled through a single 
national fund.  
Important to note is that the level at which REDD+ payments are distributed 
does not necessarily determine which actors will receive REDD+ benefits. Most R-
PPs, even the ones that envision a national distribution mechanism, acknowledge that 
REDD+ benefits need to be allocated to local people who live in REDD+ project 
areas. In developing benefit-sharing mechanisms, for example, Indonesia, Nepal, 
Tanzania and Vietnam plan to draw on experiences with community-based forest 
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management, or²in the case of Indonesia²with community-based benefit-sharing in 
WKHFRXQWU\¶Vpoverty reduction strategy.  
 
 
Figure 3: 3HUFHQWDJHV RI QDWLRQDO SROLF\ DFWRUV GLVDJUHHLQJ ZLWK WKH VWDQFH ³$OO
REDD accounting and payments should go through the nationaOJRYHUQPHQWV´.  
 
Table 5: Framing of the level at which REDD+ should be governed in the R-PPs (and 
ER-PINs). 
At what level should REDD+ be governed? 
 What is the proposed reference 
level? 
At what level are REDD+ payments 
handled and distributed? 
Cameroon Not much detail  National level, but not much detail ĺ 
(Weak) national storyline 
Indonesia National level, sub-national where 
needed ĺ (Weak) national / 
nested storyline 
National level, but not yet fully 
developed ĺ (Weak) national storyline 
Nepal Nested approach ĺ Nested 
storyline 
To be determined 
 
PNG Not much detail on sub-national 
level, transition to national level 
ĺ National / nested storyline 
National level with stakeholder 
participation ĺ National storyline 
Peru Nested approach, transition to 
national level ĺ Nested storyline 
Sub-national and project level, transition 
to national level ĺ Nested / sub-
national storyline 
Tanzania National level, sub-national level 
mentioned without much detail ĺ 
(Weak) national / nested 
storyline 
Envisions national REDD+ trust fund, 
but not much detail ĺ (Weak) national 
storyline 
Vietnam Project level, transition to national 
level ĺ Nested storyline 
National level, payments managed at 
provincial (and district) level ĺ (Weak) 
nested storyline 
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4.4. How should REDD+ be financed? 
Views among policy actors regarding how REDD+ should be financed (market-based 
or fund-based) were strongly divided, both within and between countries. While in 
Nepal more than 70% of the actors²including most government agencies²agreed 
that REDD+ should only be financed through funds, in Cameroon, Indonesia and Peru 
nearly 60% of the actors disagreed with this stance (Figure 4). Also government 
agencies within most countries were strongly divided in their answers to this stance. 
Interestingly, semi-structured interviews revealed virtually no discussion among 
policy actors of how to acquire market- or fund-based REDD+ finances. Interviewees 
were more concerned with how to use and allocate REDD+ payments than with how 
to obtain them. This question is also given scant attention in the R-PPs. While some 
R-PPs make reference to sources of funding, most R-PPs do not contain a clear 
vision, let alone a strategy, on how to secure REDD+ financing in the long run. The 
ER-PINs of the four countries we analyzed provide little more detail. Despite the fact 
that more than 30% of the policy actors across the seven countries agreed that 
REDD+ should only be financed through fundsQRQHRIWKHFRXQWULHV¶5-PPs 
envision or plan to prepare for a REDD+ mechanism that is entirely fund-based. Most 
R-PPs reflect the market-based storyline by implicitly or explicitly referring to a 
market-based REDD+ mechanism (Table 6; Figure 5).  
The countries with the strongest vision on how to finance REDD+²PNG and 
most notably Peru²both envision and prepare for a market-based REDD+ 
mechanism. Peru¶s R-33WDNHVDQ³DSSURDFKWKDWSURPRWHVSXEOLFDQGSULYDWH
LQYHVWPHQWLQIRUHVWFDUERQWUDGH´ (R-PP Peru, 2011, p. 11), and aims to reduce 
market uncertainties that may prevent such investments. It also states that most of 
3HUX¶VHDUO\5(''LQLWLDWLYHVDUHIOH[LEOHHQRXJKWRbecome part of D³possible 
IXWXUHUHJXODWHGPDUNHW´ (p. 74). Peru¶V(5-PIN even considers developing a national 
carbon market and envisions a market-based approach to facilitate the generation of 
non-carbon benefits. Similar to Peru, PNG intends to participate in a UNFCCC 
compliance carbon market with participation of the private sector. The country plans 
to revise its current land tenure system to support this envisioned market-based 
approach to REDD+ (see also Babon and Gowae, 2013). 
Also Indonesia, Nepal and Tanzania (though weakly) reflect the market-based 
storyline in their plans to prepare for REDD+ (see also Indrarto et al., 2012). Their R-
PPs mention measures such as exploring potential carbon markets, enhancing 
confidence and credibility in the international carbon market, and developing and 
reviewing legislation and institutional frameworks for forest carbon trade. None of 
these FRXQWULHV¶5-PPs or ER-PINs, however, provide much detail on such measures.  
As Figure 4 shows, Cameroon was the country with the highest percentage of 
policy actors disagreeing that REDD+ should only be financed through funds. 
&DPHURRQ¶V5-PP is the only one that (though weakly) reflects the hybrid storyline by 
preparing for both market- and fund-based finances. &DPHURRQ¶V5-PP mentions the 
need to mobilize expertise not only on carbon markets, but also on the procedures of 
donors and fund-raising. According to Dkamela (2011), however, Cameroon does 
envision a long-term transition to the carbon market.  
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Figure 1: 3HUFHQWDJHVRIQDWLRQDOSROLF\DFWRUVGLVDJUHHLQJZLWKWKHVWDQFH³5(''
VFKHPHVVKRXOGRQO\EHILQDQFHGWKURXJKIXQGV´.  
 
Table 6: Framing of how REDD+ should be financed in the R-PPs (and ER-PINs). 
How should REDD+ be financed? 
 What is the envisioned 
long-term funding 
approach? 
What arrangements are made for the 
acquisition of funding? 
Cameroon Not explicit 8QGHUVWDQGGRQRUV¶SURFHGXUHVSURPRWH
fund-raising, mobilize expertise on carbon 
markets, but not much detail ĺ (Weak) 
hybrid storyline 
Indonesia Not explicit  Enhance confidence in carbon markets and 
explore potential markets, but not much 
detail ĺ (Weak) market-based storyline 
Nepal Not explicit  Make REDD+ more sellable and develop 
forest carbon trade legislation, but not much 
detail ĺ (Weak) market-based storyline 
PNG Compliance carbon market 
ĺ Market-based storyline 
Comply with standards of compliance 
market ĺ Market-based storyline 
Peru Regulated carbon market ĺ 
(Strong) market-based 
storyline 
Eliminate market barriers (R-PP), enable 
diversified carbon prices (ER-PIN) ĺ 
(Strong) market-based storyline 
Tanzania Not explicit Review frameworks for and build capacity 
on carbon markets, but not much detail ĺ 
(Weak) market-based storyline 
Vietnam No vision No details  
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Figure 5: Overview of storylines reflected in the R-PPs, distinguishing between the 
two indicators per question identified in section 2. N.B. the R-PPs of those countries 
that are missing in the figure did not provide sufficient detail to determine which 
storyline these reflected. 
 
5. Discussion 
What are the possible consequences of the prominence of different REDD+ storylines 
for national forest governance in the seven countries? We try to answer this question 
by assessing the likelihood that REDD+ stimulates the earlier-mentioned 
³FDUERQL]DWLRQ´³WHFKQLFDOL]DWLRQ´³FHQWUDOL]DWLRQ´DQG³PDUNHWL]DWLRQ´ of forest 
governance, based on the results discussed above and existing literature. 
As to whether REDD+ may lead to a carbonization of forest governance, the 
large agreement among policy actors and references in R-PPs that REDD+ should 
also realize non-carbon benefits such as poverty reduction and biodiversity 
conservation would suggest otherwise. However, of the seven countries, only 
Cameroon and Nepal outline relatively detailed plans to monitor non-carbon benefits, 
while few policy actors paid attention to this issue (see also Davis and Daviet 2010 
for similar observations in other countries). Without monitoring, ensuring co-benefits 
might remain an exclusively rhetorical statement, especially since what is being 
monitored largely determines what is taken into account (Gupta et al., 2012). Most 
REDD+ countries have a rather limited capacity to monitor environmental and social 
(non-carbon) benefits and safeguards (Angelsen et al., 2012; Jagger et al., 2014). 
Hence, a carbonization of forest governance remains a possibility in the five countries 
that did not outline plans to develop systems to monitor non-carbon benefits. This 
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could lead to the disregard of non-carbon benefits. Our analysis also suggests, 
however, that countries in later stages of REDD+ readiness, such as Vietnam and 
Indonesia, made progress toward developing more detailed plans for non-carbon and 
safeguard monitoring systems.  
With regard to whether REDD+ may stimulate a technicalization of forest 
governance, all R-33VH[FHSW31*¶VFRQWDLQSODQVWRLQYROYHORFDOFRPPXQLWLHVLQ
the execution and/or design of REDD+ MRV systems. Some literature, however, 
suggests that technical aspects of MRV systems dominate national REDD+ policy 
developments, which inhibits local participation, even in countries with a long history 
of community-based forestry such as Nepal (Bushley and Khatri, 2013; Paudel and 
Karki, 2014; Astuti and McGregor, 2015). Additionally, plans to involve local 
communities in REDD+ monitoring do not necessarily translate into an 
operationalization of community-based monitoring in national REDD+ MRV systems 
(Vijge and Gupta, 2014; Skutsch et al., 2014; Paudel et al., 2013; Ojha et al., 2013; 
Pham et al., 2012). Though some countries have experience with community-based 
monitoring, this has not been nested effectively within national level MRV systems in 
any one country (Pratihast et al., 2013). Further analyses of current and planned 
institutional arrangements would therefore be needed to assess whether the plans for 
community-based monitoring in six of the seven countries we analyzed are likely to 
be implemented. 
Our analysis showed that REDD+ might lead to a centralization of forest 
governance, even for countries that plan to make use of national as well as sub-
national reference levels. The nested approach is predominantly considered as an 
interim solution in the process toward a national accounting system (see also Rantala 
and Di Gregorio, 2014; Angelsen et al., 2009). Most countries require REDD+ 
payments to be handled at and distributed through the national level. Related to this, a 
study of 32 REDD+ readiness proposals shows that countries structurally fail to 
discuss how local institutions could play a role in REDD+ benefit distribution 
(Williams, 2013). Even in Peru, the country that most strongly advocates the nested 
approach, weak governance capacity at the sub-national level poses significant 
challenges to the implementation of a decentralized or nested approach to REDD+ 
(Piu and Menton, 2014; White, 2014). Such challenges have also been identified in 
the case of Indonesia, PNG, Tanzania, Vietnam and even Nepal with its long history 
of decentralized forest governance (Kashwan, 2015; Babon and Gowae, 2013; 
Murdiyarso et al., 2012; Jagger et al., 2014; Bushley, 2014; Pham et al., 2013).  
Finally, whether REDD+ stimulates a marketization of forest governance 
remains to be seen. While most countries implicitly or explicitly assume a market-
based REDD+ mechanism, only two of the R-PPs we analyzed clearly indicate what 
type of REDD+ funding they envision. The R-PPs contain scant consideration of how 
to prepare for acquisition of such funding. Minang et al. (2014) similarly show that 
there is very little progress on REDD+ financing mechanisms in REDD+ readiness 
processes in Cameroon, Indonesia, Peru and Vietnam. Our analysis of the semi-
structured interviews also revealed that only few policy actors discussed their 
preferred funding mechanism for REDD+, with virtually no discussion of institutional 
arrangements to stimulate the acquisition of REDD+ funding. Given that large 
uncertainty continues to exist in global REDD+ policy debates on the sources of 
REDD+ funding (Gupta et al., 2015)²even after the Conferences of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC in 2015²most countries seem to take a wait-and-see approach to this issue.  
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6. Conclusion   
In emerging policy domains such as REDD+, discourse analyses can provide deep 
insights into the direction that a particular policy takes and the (possible) 
consequences of the institutionalization of certain discourses or storylines. Through 
an analysis of prominent storylines, this article showed that a carbonization of forest 
governance, whereby non-carbon benefits such as the provision of local livelihoods 
and biodiversity conservation are disregarded, remains a possibility in the majority of 
REDD+ countries studied here. That said, our analysis showed that countries in later 
stages of REDD+ readiness outline more detailed policies for safeguarding or 
promoting non-carbon values of forests in their ER-PINs. In this regard, the 
development of effective safeguard plans and monitoring systems remains crucial. 
Major attention should also be given to the risks of a centralization of forest 
governance, given the emphasis on accounting and managing REDD+ payments at 
the national level. This may lead to limited involvement of sub-national state and non-
state actors²including local communities²in the management of forests, which 
might reduce compliance (Phelps et al., 2010; Sandbrook et al., 2010). In order to 
avoid this, one way forward could be to focus resources on putting FRXQWULHV¶ 
participatory monitoring plans into practice and direct capacity-building efforts to 
sub-national levels to enable REDD+ accounting at those levels. Well-integrated sub-
national institutions that take up REDD+ responsibilities beyond what is conceived in 
the R-PPs need to be developed. This may also help build often neglected linkages 
between national readiness activities and sub-national demonstration or pilot activities 
(Peters-Stanley et al., 2013). In order for such activities to be meaningful in the long 
run, however, countries would do well to develop more specific funding strategies to 
acquire and prepare for results-based REDD+ payments. 
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